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Abstract
We analyze a repeated principal-agent trust game where the principal makes a
specific investment by paying the agent up-front, expecting an agreed upon quality
level in return. The verifiability of the agent’s action is endogenously determined by
the principal’s investment in writing an explicit contract. Since verification is not
certain, explicit contracting is insuﬃcient, and the parties must engage in relational
(implicit) contracting. First, we analyze how variations in trust (the discount factor)
aﬀect the contract equilibrium. Interestingly, we find that more trust may lead to
lower levels of specific investments. This occurs when the surplus from trust is realized
mainly through lower explicit contract costs. Second, we extend the literature on the
interaction between explicit and relational governance by analyzing how variations
in verification technology aﬀect contract equilibrium. Since verification technology
determines the cost necessary to achieve a given probability of verification, this analysis
can also explain interesting aspects of legal systems.
Keywords: Trust, Relationship Specific Investments, Relational Contracts, Endogenous
Verifiability
1 Introduction
For contracting parties it is always to some extent uncertain whether a legal court is
able to enforce the real intents of their contract. The strict requirements of verifiability
makes it costly, if not impossible, for the parties to arrange their transactions and design
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their contract in a way that makes it completely protected by the court. If property
rights allocation do not provide the parties with proper incentives to transact, they must
therefore rely on self-enforcement. Through repeated transactions they can make it costly
for each other to breach the contract, by letting breach ruin future trade. But the self-
enforcing range of contracts is limited, so the court’s ability to enforce the contract is
not without consequence for the contracting parties. If possible, the parties may thus
have incentives to take costly actions that aﬀect the ability of the court. Both ex ante
preparations in terms of detailed contracting, and ex post revelation of information can
increase the probability of fair court enforcement. In this paper, we focus on the former,
assuming that the parties are able to improve the verifiability of the contracted upon
actions by careful ex ante contract specifications. We assume that careful contracting can
improve the court’s ability to verify whether an action is equal to the one described in
the contract. Then we ask: what happens to the self-enforcing contract equilibrium if a
party takes actions ex ante that aﬀect the verifiability of actions ex post? In order to
give some answers to this question, we analyze a simple repeated principal-agent game
where the verifiability of the agent’s actions is endogenously determined by the principal’s
investments in drafting an explicit contract pertaining to the quality of the agent’s output.
The existing principal-agent literature assumes at the outset that some variables are
verifiable, and thus enforceable by courts, and some are not. Models with Costly State
Verification (CSV) have focused on contract design problems where enforcement and thus
verifiability is a decision variable, but the CSV approach considers verification of exogenous
state variables, not endogenous variables as here (see Krasa and Villamil (2000) for a
generalization of the CSV models). Ishiguro (2002) analyzes a model with endogenous
verifiability of endogenous eﬀort variables. In his model, verifiability is determined by the
parties’ choices when disputes arise, while we analyze a model where verifiability depends
on choices taken ex ante. Ishiguro does not consider the eﬀect of endogenous verifiability
in repeated relationships, as we do.
In repeated game models of relational (also called implicit) contracts, verifiability is al-
ways exogenously given. By definition, a relational contract relies only on self-enforcement;
eﬀort variables are non-verifiable, and the parties honor the contract as long as the present
value of honoring exceeds the present value of reneging. MacLeod and Malcomson (1989)
make a definite treatment of relational contracts with symmetric information. Schmidt
and Schnitzer (1995) analyze a repeated relationship where some actions can be verified
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and some cannot, while Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (1994) analyze a model with one
action generating one verifiable, but imperfect signal and one perfect, but non-verifiable
signal. But the verifiability of a given action or signal is exogenously given in these mod-
els. The present paper is, to our knowledge, the first to analyze endogenous verifiability
of actions in a repeated principal-agent model.1
1.1 Summary of Results
In our model the principal makes a specific investment by paying the agent up-front and
expecting an agreed upon quality level in return. If they transact repeatedly, the principal
can safeguard her investment by threatening to end the relationship if the agent abuse
her trust. In addition she can write a detailed contract specifying quality in order to
increase the probability of court verification. Since both quality and verifiability is costly,
the principal faces trade-oﬀs. These trade-oﬀs reveal several interesting relationships:
Trust
First, it complicates the relationship between trust and specific investments. Let the
famous merger between General Motors (GM) and Fisher Body in 1926 be a backdrop.
The classic interpretation is that GM acquired Fisher Body because of relationship spe-
cific underinvestment and contractual hold-up (see Klein, Crawford and Alchian, 1978;
Williamson,1985; Hart, 1995; Klein 2000 ). Others oppose to this view, arguing that
the relationship between GM and Fisher Body prior to 1926, exhibited trust rather than
opportunism (see Casadeus-Masanell and Spulber, 2000; Coase, 2000; Freeland, 2000).
Are these views necessarily incompatible? Cannot underinvestment go hand in hand with
trust?
We know that the problem of relationship specific underinvestment is due to incom-
plete contracting. If contracts are complete, first-best investments can easily be achieved.
Moreover, we know that trust can be a source of contractual incompleteness: Why spend
eﬀort in writing a detailed contract with somebody you trust? It is somewhat surprising,
then, that in the incomplete contract literature, or more precisely in the literature on self-
enforcing relational contracts, the degree of relationship specific investments is always a
1Enforcement mechanisms are also an issue in the emerging economics literature on courts (e.g. Djankov,
La Porta, Lopez-De-Silanes, Schleifer, 2003; Johnson, McMillan, Woodruﬀ, 2002; Glaeser and Shleifer,
2002). This literature is concerned with factors that decide the court’s abilty to enforce contracts, but do
not model endogenous verifiability of eﬀort variables.
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positive function of trust: the higher trust-level, the closer one gets first-best investments.
If trust generates contractual incompleteness, could it not also generate underinvestment?
We show that once we allow for diﬀerent levels of contractual incompleteness, modeled
as endogenously determined probabilities of legal enforcement, the relationship between
trust and relationship specific appropriable investments is not crystal clear. In fact, under
certain conditions the level of specific investments can be a negative function of trust.
Assume P invests s in A and expects q in return, where s is appropriable by A if q cannot
be verified. For P to do this, A must be trustworthy. The more trustworthy A is, i.e. the
greater A’s incentives are to honor trust, the more P will invest in A. Moreover assume
that P spends money and eﬀort in contract specifications in order to safeguard s. The
more she spends in contract specifications, the higher is the probability, v, that a court
can verify q, and thus legally enforce the contract. Now, what happens if the trust-level
increases, i.e. A’s incentives to honor trust increases? First, there is an income eﬀect: P
will realize the surplus from higher trust by ordering a larger q, and/or reducing contract
costs by lowering v. But there may also be a substitution eﬀect: If higher trust makes q
more costly in terms of v, i.e. if the level of v that is necessary to achieve a given level of q
increases, P will substitute lower v for q. If this substitution eﬀect dominates the income
eﬀect of higher trust, the investment level becomes negatively related to trust. Hence, the
surplus from trust is not necessarily realized through higher investment-levels, it might as
well be realized through lower contract costs, which in turn lowers specific investments.
Verification technology
Following Chakravorty and MacLeod (2004), the present paper views explicit contracts
’as part of the technology of exchange’2. A proper level of explicit contracting is part of
the eﬃcient solution. The verification technology, i.e. the court’s ability to verify whether
an action is equal to the one described in the contract, will decide the eﬃcient level of
contracting. Verification technology can be defined as the eﬀort necessary to achieve a
given level of verifiability (i.e. probability of verification) for a given transaction. By
studying the eﬀect of exogenous changes in verification technology we can (i) explain
certain interesting aspects of legal systems and (ii) gain insight in the interactions between
2Chakravorty and MacLeod models a situation where increased explicit contracting in form of project
design and planning results in more certainty regarding the desired ex post design. Also Bajari and
Tadelis (2001) endogenize contract incompleteness by choosing the proper degree of planning. In their
model increased planning reduces ex post transaction costs due to costly renegotiation.
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explicit and relational governance.
With respect to (i) we find an ambiguous relationship between verification technology
and the equilibrium verifiability level. In particular we find that the surplus from better
verification technology can be realized through lower contract costs and thus lower verifia-
bility. This suggests that the verifiability level, and thus the predictability of the court, is
not a good measure for the ability of the court. The model also predicts lower equilibrium
verifiability level in civil law then in common law systems.
With respect to (ii), the model complements the literature on explicit versus relational
contracting. It is well established in the literature that formal, verifiable contracts can
both limit and expand the self-enforcing range of relational contracts (most notable Baker,
Gibbons and Murphy, 1994; and Schmidt and Schnitzer, 1995).3 The logic behind this
ambiguity is that better formal contracts enhances the long-term fallback position of the
contracting parties, but at the same time reduces the short term gain from deviation. We
complement this literature with a new aspect: If something with the formal contract is
changed, not only the eﬃciency of the contract is changed, but also the probability of
verification. This has some implications for a theory of the interaction between explicit
and relational governance. In particular we find that explicit and relational governance
can be complements even if there is a positive surplus from spot contracting.
Legal breach remedies
The model may also contribute to our understanding of how legal breach remedies
aﬀect the scope of contracting. In the main part we assume that the court applies ’specific
performance’ as a breach remedy, i.e. the breacher is required to perform what was con-
tracted upon. Since there is no uncertainty over the value of the transaction in our model,
specific performance is equivalent to ’expectation damages’, in which the breacher has to
pay the amount that makes the victim equally well oﬀ as under contract performance.
Specific performance and expectation damages are standard legal breach remedies,4 but
in the last part we analyze the eﬀect of a less common remedy, namely ’reliance dam-
3Other models within the ’self-enforcing contract literature’ that addresses the relationship between
explicit and relational governance are Pearce and Stacchetti (1998), Klein (1996), and Dixit (2004). Earlier,
but less formal contributions, are MacNeil (1980) and North (1990). Also the ’reciprocity literature’ has
made important contributions, viewing explicit contracting as a move away from a reciprocal relationship
to a strict ’economic’ interaction (see e.g. Frey, 1997; Fehr and Gachter, 2000; Lubell and Scholz, 2001).
4Expectation damages is the most typical remedy, but specific performance is increasingly used in
commercial contexts (see Edlin and Reichelstein, 1996)
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ages’5, where the breacher compensates the victim such that the latter is equally well oﬀ
as before the contract was signed. We show that this remedy increases the scope of rela-
tional contracting. The intuition is simple: Since the contract is valuable for both parties,
’reliance damages’ reduce the expected short-term gain from breach and hence create a
greater scope for relational contracting.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows: Section 2 presents the basic model.
In Sections 3 and 4 we analyze how the relational contract equilibrium varies with trust
and verification technology, respectively. In Section 5 we briefly discuss how variations in
breach remedies aﬀects the scope of relational contracting. Section 6 concludes.
2 The Model
Consider a relationship between a risk neutral principal and a risk neutral agent where
the principal pays the agent s to make the agent deliver a good with a quality that the
principal values q. Payoﬀ to the principal is q − s. Payoﬀ to the agent is s− C(q) where
C(q) is the cost of producing quality q, and C 0(q) > 0, C 00(q) > 0, C(0) = 0. Total surplus
from the transaction is then Π(q) = q−C(q). Reservation payoﬀs are normalized to zero.
We will consider the relationship as a one-sided trust game where the principal pays
the agent s up-front, trusting that the agent will deliver on the agreed upon quality q.
The agent can honor that trust by delivering q, or he can abuse trust by not delivering a
value adding quality, that is q0 = 0.6 Note that the principal’s choice of q reflects her level
of specific investments, since s is appropriable by the agent and expected q is a strictly
positive function of s.
Assume first that the there is no probability that the court can verify q. Assume also
that the principal is the owner of the good produced, so that the agent cannot hold-up
values ex post. Played only once, the Nash equilibrium is [s = 0, q = 0] , hence a one-shot
transaction (spot contract) has low value - normalized to zero.7
If the game is played repeatedly, and the discount factor is suﬃciently high, then trigger
strategies constitute a subgame perfect Nash equilibrium where some [s, q] is played in
5Although less common in private contracting, it is the default remedy in government contracting (Che
and Chung, 1999).
6Trust-abuse is equivalent to any q0 6= q, but if the agent is to abuse trust, his optimal deviation is to
play q0 = 0
7This corresponds to the ’spot employment’ contract in Baker, Gibbons and Murphy (2002).
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every stage game. What trigger strategies? We assume that the principal plays as follows:
If the agent honored the contract in all previous periods τ < t, then principal honors
the contract in period t. If not, the principal oﬀers a spot contract s = 0 forever after,
where the agent responds by playing q = 0. The agent will thus honor trust as long as
1
1−δ (s− C(q)) ≥ s, where δ is the discount factor. The principal does not have incentives
to deviate ex post; it is the ex ante condition q ≥ s that binds. It is possible to find such
s iﬀ q ≥ C(q)δ . An eﬃcient contract maximizes surplus q−C(q), subject to q ≥
C(q)
δ . This
yields first-best quality level q = qF for δ so large that qF > C(q
F )
δ . For lower δ, optimal
quality satisfies q = C(q)δ .
Assume now that the parties to a certain extent can rely on a third party (the court) to
verify q. Let v be the probability that the true value of the good will be verified in a court
of law in case of contract breach. Verification implies legal enforcement. If the parties
can write contracts specifying large penalties in case of contract breach, first-best is easily
implemented when there is a positive probability of verification. In line with actual court
behavior, it is reasonable to assume, however, that contracted penalties are denied if they
are suﬃciently large relative to the actual loss from contract breach.8
We assume that if a contract breach is verified, the court applies ’specific performance’
as a breach remedy, i.e. the breacher is required to perform what was contracted upon,
which in our model means that the agent is legally forced to deliver q to the cost of C(q).
As noted, since there is no uncertainty over the value of the transaction in our model,
specific performance is equivalent to ’expectation damages’, in which the breacher has to
pay the amount that makes the victim equally well oﬀ as under contract performance9.
With expectation damages, Ishiguro (2002) shows that first-best is achievable in one-
shot transactions (under some strict assumptions) if a party spends eﬀort in verifying
actions ex-post. Here we assume that it is not possible to take actions ex post production
that aﬀects the probability of legal enforcement.10 Eﬀorts to improve verifiability must be
8The common law tradition prevents courts from enforcing terms stipultating damages that exceed the
actual harm. Civil law countries show more willingness to enforce contract penalties, but penalties are
reduced if they are unreasonable large.
9Specific performance and expectation damages typicially diﬀers if there is uncertainty over costs, for
instance if the true cost function is revealed ex post contract signing, but ex ante complete performance.
10 If this assumptions seems strong, recall that it is implicitly made in all principal-agent models (except
Ishiguro’s). It can, for instance, be assumed that ex post verification eﬀort is too costly (expensive lawyers
etc.).
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taken ex ante. Let K(v) be the cost to achieve verifiability level v. We can interpret K
as the costs associated with writing explicit contracts specifying qualities of the good.
If full verification, i.e. v = 1, is possible, first-best quality is in principle achievable
in one-shot transactions. A contract is then fully verifiable at cost K(1), and if this
cost is not too high, the parties can engage in a one-shot explicit contract with surplus
qF − C(qF )−K(1). For the most part, we will, however, assume that 0 ≤ v < 1, i.e. the
principal cannot achieve v = 1. This is the standard assumption in the relational contract
literature (that is: v = 0 is the standard assumption). The assumption says that even if
the contract is extremely detailed and seemingly covers all contingencies, there will always
be some uncertainty as to whether the court in fact is able to verify the true intent of the
contract. In Section 4.1 we will discuss implications of allowing v = 1.
Let us then consider the relational contract constraints. If the agent now abuses trust,
he will with probability v nevertheless be forced to deliver q at the cost C(q). The agent
will therefore honor trust if
1
1− δ (s− C(q)) ≥ s− vC(q) (1)
Note that q > 0 is impossible in one shot transactions (i.e. when δ = 0) since the expected
value from reneging exceeds the expected value from honoring when v < 1.
As noted, with up-front payments, the principal has nothing to renege from ex post.11
It is the ex ante condition that binds. The ex ante condition simply says that the per
period expected surplus must be positive, that is
q −D(δ)K(v) ≥ s (2)
where D(δ)K(v) is the ’dynamic cost’ of contracting. We will mostly discuss two cases:
i) D(δ) = 1− δ which means that the principal only carries contract costs K in the first
period, and ii) D(δ) = 1 where K is carried every period.
It is possible to find an s satisfying (1) and (2) iﬀ
G(v, q) = q − 1
δ
(1− (1− δ)v)C(q)−D(δ)K(v) ≥ 0 (3)
11 If salary s is to be paid ex post, it is the principal, not the agent, that has incentives to deviate ex post.
As in the case with up front payments, q > 0 is not achiveable in one shot transactions since q−s < q−vs
when v < 1.
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Figure 1: Constraint and indiﬀerence curves
An eﬃcient contract should maximize per period surplus
q − C(q)−D(δ)K(v)
subject to (3). The problem is illustrated in Figure 1.12
The heavy curve represents the constraint, with admissible (q, v)−values in the north-
west region (and bounded by v = 1). The thin curves are iso-surplus (indiﬀerence) curves,
with the lower curve representing a higher surplus. With no verification investment (v = 0)
the maximal surplus that can be achieved is q0 − C(q0), where q0 = q0(δ) < qF is de-
fined by q0 = C(q0)/δ. In the figure the upper indiﬀerence curve represents this surplus.
The figure illustrates that one can achieve a higher surplus by making some ’verification
investments’ and thus move along the curve representing the constraint.
Given some regularity conditions the constraint can be represented as v = v(q, δ), and
the objective then takes the form
F (q, δ) = q − C(q)−D(δ)K(v(q, δ)) (4)
The first order condition for an interior maximum is
Fq(q, δ) = 1− C 0(q)−D(δ)K 0(v(q, δ))vq(q, δ) = 0, (5)
or vq =
1−C0(q)
D(δ)K0(v) ; i.e. tangency between the constraint curve and the relevant indiﬀerence
curve. We will here consider cases where the constraint curve is increasing everywhere
(vq > 0). The optimum will then entail a quality level q < qF . In appendix we prove the
following:
12The figure is generated with D(δ) = 1, C(q) = 1
2
q2, K(v) = av, δ = 1
4
and a = 1
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Proposition 1 Assume q0(δ) > 0. The problem has an interior solution with v ∈ (0, 1)
and q ∈ (q0, qF ) if K(0) and K 0(0) are suﬃciently small.
We are now interested in how the optimum varies with the level of trust, represented
by δ, and the level of verification technology, represented by the cost K(v) required to
obtain a verification probability v.
3 Trust
The repeated game approach formalizes an economic concept of trust and trustworthiness
(see James Jr. 2002 for a nice survey on the economic concept of trust). A party honors
trust if the present value of honoring exceeds the present value of abusing trust. In such,
the discount factor is a proxy for trust. In a repeated relationship between P and A, if
P knows that A has a high discount factor, P knows that A values future trade with P.
Hence P trusts A and A is trustworthy.
A common feature of the self-enforcing relational contracts studied in the literature is
that specific appropriable investments is positively related to the parties discount factors.
The higher the discount factor, the higher is the present value of the ongoing relationship
relatively to the present value of reneging on the contract. When this ’punishment’ from
reneging increases, the parties are able to generate higher quasi-rents without running the
risk of opportunism. Hence, the higher discount factor, the closer the parties come first-
best investments. We will here show that this relationship between discount factors and
specific investments is not monotonically positive when there is an endogenous determined
probability of contract verification.
From (3) we see that if the trust-level (δ) increases, the constraint is relaxed, so the
social surplus must increase. Geometrically the constraint curve shifts downwards. If
the ’verification investment’ level v is held fixed, the higher trust level then allows for a
higher implementable quality q. But both v and q will optimally change with δ. Note
that the higher trust level δ will aﬀect the slope of the constraint curve. If the slope
increases (vqδ > 0), the rate of substitution between v and q increases, so it becomes
more costly to substitute quality for lower verification investment. This price change will
induce a substitution eﬀect that in isolation will lead to reduced quality. But there may also
be an ’income eﬀect’ working in the opposite direction on quality. These considerations
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indicate that the equilibrium response to a higher level of trust may be either a higher or
a lower level of quality. We will demonstrate that the equilibrium quality level may in fact
decrease.
Given an interior solution we obtain from the first order condition (5);
q0(δ) =
Fqδ(q, δ)
−Fqq(q, δ)
Assuming the second order condition (Fqq < 0) is fulfilled, we see that q0(δ) has the same
sign as Fqδ. In the appendix we prove the following:
Proposition 2 For an interior solution we have
sign q0(δ) = sign
©
−D0(δ)K 0(v) (1− v) +
£
K 0(v)−K 00(v)(1− v)
¤
(1− δ)vδ
ª
(6)
where vδ < 0
Consider first the case where K is paid every period i.e. D(δ) = 1. This is the relevant
case when the principal must modify the contract every period. Note that even if the
contract is modified, this does not necessarily mean that equilibrium v is changed. In
fact, we consider stationary contracts where the equilibrium v and q is assumed to apply
every (remaining) period. This case arises when new technological developments imply
that the content of q changes, but the costs required to produce the object of value q and
the verification level v do not change. Then contract modifications are required even if
costs C(q) and K(v) are unaﬀected.
With D(δ) = 1 we see from (6) that quality decreases with more trust (q0(δ) < 0)
when K 0(v) > K 00(v)(1 − v). This is not a strong requirement. For instance, it holds if
verification costs are linear (K 00 = 0) in a neighborhood of the equilibrium point.
To better understand this condition, consider the equilibrium relation (5). Computing
vq = −Gq/Gv from the constraint (3), this relation can be written as
1− C 0(q)
D(δ)K 0(v)
= vq =
1
δ (1− (1− δ)v)C 0(q)− 1
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
Collecting terms (and accounting for D(δ) = 1 or D(δ) = 1− δ) we can write the relation
as follows
D(δ)K 0(v)(1− v) =
¡
1− C 0(q)
¢ C(q)
C 0(q)
(7)
In the case D(δ) = 1 we see that this condition defines a relation between v and q that
is independent of δ. It thus defines the locus of equilibrium (q, v) points as δ varies. The
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Figure 2: Constraints, indiﬀerence curves and equilibrium locus.
right hand side is decreasing in q at an interior optimum, and the locus will therefore be
upward (downward) sloping if K 0(v)(1 − v) is decreasing (increasing). This is precisely
what is captured in (6). Figure 2 provides an illustration.13
In Figure 2 the equilibrium locus is downward sloping for small v and upwards sloping
for larger v. It corresponds to a quadratic cost function K(v) = kv2, where thus K 0(v)(1−
v) is increasing for v < 12 and decreasing for v >
1
2 . For low δ the equilibrium verification
level v is high, and increased trust will then lead to a reduction of quality q. For higher δ
the equilibrium verification level v is low, and increased trust will then increase equilibrium
quality q.
Consider next the case where K is carried only in the first period i.e.,D(δ) = (1− δ).
Here the principal invests in developing a contract in the first period, and then uses this
as a standard contract in the remaining periods. Then D0(δ) = −1, so q0(δ) < 0 iﬀ
K 0(v) (1− v) < −
£
K 0(v)−K 00(v)(1− v)
¤
(1− δ)vδ
We observe that if K 0(v) < K 00(v)(1 − v), then q0(δ) > 0. But if K 0(v) > K 00(v)(1 − v),
then q0(δ) is not necessarily negative, hence, the requirements for q0(δ) < 0 is stricter when
K is carried only once. For instance, with linear verification costs we see that q0(δ) < 0 if
(1− v) < −(1− δ)vδ which is only true for low δ.
In this section we have shown that higher trust can reduce the quality level, i.e. the
level of specific investments. We have also seen that this relationship is especially relevant
in cases where the principal must invest in contract specifications every period. We can say
13The figure is generated with C(q) = 3
8
q2, so qF = 4
3
, and K(v) = 1
2
v2.
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that the more contract modifications that are needed during the relationship (that is the
higher D0(δ), where max D0(δ) is zero), the more likely it is that the ’surplus from trust’
is realized through lower explicit contract costs instead of higher specific investments.
This corollary is quite intuitive. In a changing environment it is costly to constantly
make new contract specifications. A high trust level can save on contract outlays, but at
the cost of lower specific investments. This also suggests that we will see lower levels of
specific investments in changing environments. In a sense this is predicted, and supported
empirically, by transactions cost economists. Williamson (1985), among others, predicts
lower levels of specific investments in transactions with much uncertainty. We do not
model uncertainty, but the diﬀerence D(δ)K(v)− (1− δ)K(v) reflects an additional cost
of dealing with the uncertainty over future contract modifications.
4 Verification Technology
The necessary cost to achieve a given level of legal enforcement may diﬀer from country to
country, from industry to industry, and from transaction to transaction. The complexity
of the transactions, the strength of enforcement institutions and the practice of legal
courts are factors that determine the verification technology. We will here analyze how
improvements in this technology aﬀect equilibrium q and equilibrium v.
The analysis extend the literature on the interaction between explicit and relational
governance. It is well established that explicit and relational governance can both be
substitutes and complements, i.e. better formal contracts can both increase and reduce
the scope of relational contracting. By far we develop the same result as Baker, Gibbons
and Murphy (1994) and Schmidt and Schnitzer (1995), but with some modifications. In
their models, explicit contracting and relational contracting are complements only when
the value of spot contracting is non-positive, if else the modes of governance are substitutes.
The reason for this is as follows: If the explicit part of the contract (i.e. the aspects that
can be completely contracted upon) is improved, the short-term gain from reneging on the
implicit non-contractible elements of the contract is reduced. But the long term loss from
reneging is also reduced. With discount factors that are suﬃciently large to implement the
relational contract, this reduction in long term loss exceeds the reduction in short term
gain. So the total reneging temptation is increased. But if the value from spot contracting
is non-positive, then the long term loss from reneging is not aﬀected by improved formal
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contracts, while the short term gain is still reduced. Hence, an improvement in the explicit
part of the contract reduces the gain from deviation if the value from spot contracting is
non-positive. If else it increases the gain from deviation.
The same fundamental mechanism appears in our model, but with a diﬀerence. We do
not separate between a formal (v = 1)and an informal part (v = 0) of the contract. Instead
the degree of formalism is decided by the contract’s v-level. In Baker et.al. and Schmidt
and Schnitzer, an exogenous change of the formal part of the contract is equivalent to
a direct change in the eﬃciency of the contract.14 In our model, an exogenous change
of the contract (exogenous change in verification technology) implies a change in the
probability of verification. This gives a slightly stronger result for complementarity. As
Baker et. al and Schmidt and Schnitzer, we find that explicit and relational governance are
complements when spot contracting yields a non-positive surplus. But, as demonstrated
in the next subsection (4.1), explicit and relational governance can also be complements
if spot contracting yields positive surplus.
First, we continue to consider the case where v = 1 is impossible, implying that spot
contracting alone cannot yield positive surplus. In such a setting, a better verification
technology relaxes the incentive constraint and thus increases the self-enforcing range
of the relational contract. Hence explicit and relational governance are complements.
However, improved verification technology does not necessarily imply that verifiability v
and quality q increase in equilibrium.
For a verification cost function K(v,κ) with Kκ ≥ 0 we will now find sign(q0(κ)). We
obtain the following result (see appendix for proof):
Proposition 3 For K(v,κ) with Kκ ≥ 0 we have
sign(q0(κ)) = sign
©
−(1− v)K 0κ +
£
K 0 − (1− v)K 00
¤
vκ
ª
, (8)
where vκ = gKκ, g > 0, and K 0κ =
∂2K
∂κ∂v .
Consider first a fixed cost increment, where K 0κ = 0. Then we get
sign
£
q0(κ)
¤
= sign
£
K 0 − (1− v)K 00
¤
14 In Baker et. al. a better formal contract means that the objective performance measure becomes less
distorted. In Schmidt and Schnitzler it means that the cost of writing the verifiable part of the contract is
reduced.
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Thus quality increases with higher fixed costs iﬀ K 0 − (1 − v)K 00 > 0. A higher fixed
cost will shift the constraint vertically upwards, but not aﬀect (the shape of) indiﬀerence
curves. The equilibrium relation (7) between q and v, and hence the equilibrium locus,
will then not be aﬀected. When this locus slopes upwards (K 0 − (1 − v)K 00 > 0) both q
and v will increase in response to the cost increase. When the locus slopes downwards
(K 0 − (1 − v)K 00 < 0), q will decrease, but v will increase. The geometrical picture
illustrating these eﬀects is similar to that in Figure 2.15
The previous discussion shows that when K 0κ = 0, improved verification technology (a
reduction of fixed costs) leads to lower verification probability in equilibrium. This may
seem counterintuitive: The principal in fact buys less of v if it becomes cheaper. But it
is the same logic as in the previous section where the principal realized the surplus from
higher trust by reducing contract costs instead of increasing quality. (q0(δ) < 0). Here, the
principal chooses to realize the surplus from improved verification technology by reducing
contract costs instead of increasing quality. And note that the condition for q0(κ) > 0 is
the same as the necessary condition for q0(δ) < 0 (suﬃcient condition when D(δ) = 1).
The result that dvdκ can be positive suggests that the ability of a country’s court system
cannot be measured from the predictability of the court. We can interpret verification
technology as the court’s ability to verify the true intent of a contract. And we can
interpret v as a proxy for the court’s predictability. Since higher court ability can give
lower verifiability in equilibrium, higher court ability can also imply less predictability in
equilibrium. We can say that the gain from a ’high ability’ court system may be realized
through a higher degree of relational contracting rather than a higher degree of explicit
contracting.
Consider next a cost change that aﬀects marginal but not fixed costs. Consider some
equilibrium (q∗, v∗). If the marginal verification costs increase locally in the sense that
K 0κ(v∗,κ) > 0 and Kκ(v∗,κ) = 0 (i.e. total verification costs is unchanged), where the
latter implies vκ = 0,we have
sign(q0(κ)) = sign
©
−(1− v)K 0κ
ª
hence q0(κ) < 0 . We can interpret a marginal change K 0κ(v∗,κ) > 0 and Kκ(v∗,κ) = 0 as
a marginal move from common to civil law practice. The common law system is assumed
15Figure 2 shows constraint curves corresponding to diﬀerent δ’s and the equilibrium locus for D(δ) = 1.
In the present case the constraint curves will exhibit vertical shifts corresponding to diﬀerent levels of fixed
costs. The position, but not the slope of the equilibrium locus, may be aﬀected by δ via D(δ).
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to be more willing to enforce specific contract terms than civil law, which to a larger extent
set party-designed contract terms aside if it conflicts with the civil codes. The marginal
eﬀect on v of investing in detailed contracts is thus assumed to be higher in common law,
but the civil codes assures that a minimum level of verifiability can be achieved at low
costs. We see that Kκ(ve,κ) = 0 implies vκ = 0 and thus dvdκ = vq
dq
dκ + vκ < 0, since vq > 0
and dqdκ < 0. Hence a move from common to civil law practice implies lower equilibrium v,
which fits with the observation that contracts are typically more detailed in common law
countries than in civil law countries.
4.1 Fully Verifiable Contracts
As noted in the introduction, if full verification, i.e. v = 1, is possible, first-best quality
is in principle achievable in one-shot transactions. A contract is then fully verifiable at
a finite cost K(1), and if this cost is not too high, a higher surplus can be achieved in a
spot contract with v = 1 than with v = 0. This possibility will also aﬀect the relational
contract equilibrium, since the parties’ fallback positions are improved. If an explicit spot
contract yields a positive per period surplus u = qF−C(qF )−D(δ)K(1) > 0, the relational
contract constraint becomes
q − 1
δ
(1− (1− δ)v)C(q)−D(δ)K(v) ≥ u
It is here worth noting that, although full verifiability (v = 1) is feasible and yields a
positive surplus also in the relational contract, it is typically (given the conditions in
Proposition 1) not an eﬃcient solution. When there is some level of trust and hence
some scope for relational contracting between the parties, they can trade between product
quality and verification investment, and this trade-oﬀ then typically leads to less than full
verifiability. They will thus not invest resources in contract specification to the extent
that the contract becomes perfectly verifiable, even if this is feasible and possibly quite
inexpensive. It is in this sense eﬃcient to leave the contract to some extent incomplete.
Another noteworthy aspect is that, in contrast to the case where the value from spot
contracting is non-positive, improved verification technology can now reduce total surplus.
Explicit and relational governance can thus be substitutes in the present case. This occurs
when the better technology improves the spot contract to such an extent that the set of
viable relational contracts becomes smaller.
Figure 3 illustrates this kind of situation. The heavy contours in the figure delineate
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Figure 3: Constraint contours and indiﬀerence curves.
the set of feasible relational contracts for two verification technologies (verification cost
functions). The dashed contour corresponds to the less favorable technology. That is, the
dashed contour corresponds to a cost function K(v,κ0) that is above the cost function
K(v,κ) associated with the solid contour.16 We see that the set of feasible relational
contracts is smaller for the better technology, and that the attainable surplus is lower for
this case.
To see this eﬀect analytically, note that the impact of a marginal cost increase on the
maximal surplus is given by
∂F
∂κ
= −D(δ)
¡
Kκ(v,κ) +K 0(v,κ)vκ
¢
where vκ from the constraint (written as G(q, v, δ,κ) ≥ 0) is given by
vκ =
−Gκ
Gv
=
1
Gv
[D(δ)Kκ(v,κ) + uκ] =
D(δ)
Gv
[Kκ(v,κ)−Kκ(1,κ)] (9)
The two terms in the expression for ∂F∂κ account for the direct eﬀect of increased costs on
the surplus, and the indirect eﬀect induced by a shift in the constraint curve, respectively.
We see that if vκ > 0, i.e. if the constraint curve shifts upwards with increased costs,
the sign of ∂F∂κ is unambiguously negative. The surplus will then decrease with higher
verification costs. But as illustrated by the figure above, we may have a downward shift
of the constraint curve (vκ < 0) in the relevant region.
16More precisely, the figure is generated for the case D(δ) = 1 and with cost functions of the form
K(v,κ) = K(v,κ0) = av for v < v1, K(v,κ) < K(v,κ0) for v1 < v ≤ 1. The upper parts of the contours
reflect that to each q there is a maximal v ≤ 1 that can be implemented. In the pevious figures the maximal
v < 1 was exogenous and not depicted.
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At an optimum where the constraint curve is upward sloping (vq > 0) we have Gv > 0,
and the sign of vκ is then given by the sign of [Kκ(v,κ)−Kκ(1,κ)]. The latter will
obviously be negative if costs increase more at v = 1 than at the relational equilibrium
point v, that is if costs increase more in the spot contract than in the relational contract.
The last term in the expression for ∂F∂κ will then negative, and it may dominate the first
term. We thus have the following result.
Proposition 4 The maximal surplus may increase or decrease with higher verification
costs. In particular, at an interior optimum (v∗, q∗) where vq > 0, we have: (i) if
Kκ(v
∗,κ) = 0 and Kκ(1,κ) > 0, then ∂F∂κ > 0, while (ii) if Kκ(v
∗,κ) > 0 and Kκ(1,κ) = 0,
then ∂F∂κ < 0.
Result (ii) from this proposition is similar to Baker et. al. and Schmidt and Schnitzer:
Explicit and Relational Governance are substitutes when spot contracting yields positive
surplus. But (i) shows that they also can be complements in this situation. We thus have
a stronger result for complementarity than Baker et. al. and Schmidt and Schnitzer. The
reason for this is that a better verification technology not only improves the eﬃciency of the
contracts. It also increases the probability of verifying a given quality level. This directly
supports the implementation of relational contracts. Interestingly, this accords well with
recent empirical and experimental studies (Poppo and Zenger, 2002; and Lazzarini, Miller
and Zenger, 2004), which find a stronger support for the complementarity hypothesis.
Turning to the eﬀects of increased verification costs on equilibrium quality we obtain
the following result.
Proposition 5 At an interior optimum where vq > 0, we have
sign(q0(κ)) = sign
£
−K 0κ(1− v) +
£
K 0 −K 00(1− v)
¤
vκ
¤
,
where vκ is given by (9)
The formal expression that determines the sign of q0(κ) is the same as in the case of
limited verifiability considered in the previous section. But there is a diﬀerence, since the
sign of vκ is ambiguous in the present case. Here this sign depends, as discussed above, on
whether verification costs increase more or less in the spot contract than in the relational
contract.
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Figure 3 illustrates this point. It depicts a situation where K 0κ = 0 and K 0 −K 00(1−
v) > 0 at the equilibrium point v for the relational contract, and where vκ < 0 due to
Kκ(v,κ)−Kκ(1,κ) < 0. In this situation the equilibrium quality will decline. Under the
same conditions, but a cost function that exhibited K 0−K 00(1− v) < 0 at the equilibrium
point, the equilibrium quality would have improved. A more costly verification process
(Kκ ≥ 0) may thus lead to either higher or lower equilibrium quality.
5 Legal Breach Remedies
The previous analysis applied a standard legal breach remedy, namely ’specific perfor-
mance’, which, as noted, equals ’expectation damages’ when there is no uncertainty over
the value of the transaction. It was assumed that the court would, in the event that quality
is verifiable, hold the agent responsible for the provision of the contracted quality (and
enforce any ex post payments by the principal). Given that the agent must be paid at
least the cost of providing that quality ex ante (e.g. because he has no wealth and cannot
borrow from others to finance the specific investment), we saw that this rule leads to the
specific IC constraint (3) for the relational contracts.
We will here briefly consider a variation of the court rule. Specifically we will consider
another reasonable rule, namely ’reliance damages’ in which the agent is held responsible
for the funds (s) allocated to him up front. Thus, in the event of any deviation q0 from
the contracted quality q, the agent is forced to repay s−C(q0) ex post if quality turns out
to be verifiable. It is straightforward to see that this rule enlarges the set of allocations
that can be implemented in a relational contract. If the agent now abuses trust, he will
with probability v be forced to repay unused funds. The agent will therefore honor trust
if 11−δ (s − C(q)) ≥ s − vs . (recall q0 = 0 and C(0) = 0). The principal must still have
q −D(δ)K(v) ≥ s .It is possible to find such an s iﬀ
q − C(q)
(1− δ)v + δ −D(δ)K(v) ≥ 0 (10)
We see that (10) is a weaker constraint then (3) if
1
(1− δ)v + δ <
1
δ
(1− (1− δ)v)
This holds if 0 ≤ v < 1 and δ < 1 (to see this note that ((1 − δ)v + δ)1δ (1 − (1 − δ)v) =
1
δ (1− v) (δ − 1)
2 v + 1 > 1).
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Since reliance damages yields a weaker relational contract constraint, the parties can
implement higher quality with this court rule. The intuition is simple: Since social surplus
is higher when the contract is fulfilled than when the contract is cancelled, the parties’
gain from breach is lower under reliance damages than under expectation damages. As
a result, the self-enforcing range of the relational contract is increased if the parties use
reliance damages instead of expectation damages.
An important insight from the literature on breach remedies, is that when contracts are
enforceable by legal courts, legal breach remedies can lead to overreliance (overinvestment)
since the promisee is always compensated in case of breach. It many settings reliance
damages leads to greater overreliance than expectation damages (Shavell, 1980; Rogerson,
1984), and the latter is therefore considered to be superior.17 With reliance damages, the
parties are made worse oﬀ in case of breach, since they must accept foregone opportunities.
Hence, they want to reduce the probability of breach. If the contract is enforceable, the
promisee (the principal in our setting) can reduce the probability of breach by increasing
her reliance, since increased reliance makes it more costly for the promisor (the agent) to
breach.
Overreliance is not a issue in our model since the only reliance is s(q) itself, and since
s0(q) > 0, overinvestment does not occur. But our model may be a starting point for
analyzing optimal breach remedies in relational contracting. Models of optimal breach
remedies always assume that contracts are verifiable, except for Edlin and Reichelstein
(1996) who integrates the literature on legal remedies with the hold-up literature. We show
how repeated interaction and endogenous verifiability may alter conclusions on optimal
breach remedies. But for our model to be really fruitful in this respect, richer reliance,
and uncertainty over the value of the transaction, should be introduced.
6 Concluding remarks
By discussing both specific investments and explicit contract costs in the same model,
we get hold of a relationship between classic references in the literature on transaction
costs and hold-up. One interpretation of the model is that the explicit contract costs, K,
correspond to Coase’s (1937) concept of transactions costs, while the eﬃciency-loss of not
17An exception: Che and Chung (1999) find that reliance damages give stronger incentives for cooperative
investments than expectation damages.
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being able to implement first-best allocations corresponds to the type of transaction costs
introduced by Klein, Crawford and Alchain (1978) and Williamson (1985), and formalized
in the property rights literature (Grossman and Hart, 1986; Hart and Moore, 1990). While
Coase focuses on the costs of “negotiating and concluding a separate contract for each
exchange transaction. . . ,” Williamson et. al. focus on problems of opportunism and under-
investment. By introducing an endogenous probability of legal contract enforcement, we
get hold of the substitutability between these types of transactions costs. But perhaps
more importantly, the model demonstrates that explicit contract costs are not transaction
costs in the meaning of waste. Contracting is an investment, and contract costs must be
considered as an endogenous variable determined in equilibrium.
As noted by Tirole (1999), scant attention has been paid to contract enforcement in
the incomplete contract literature. In models of relational contracts, enforcement is the
central issue, but probabilities of legal enforcement is excluded. By introducing endogenous
verifiability in a relational contract set-up, we show how legal institutions can play a role
in trust environments. Along these lines the model may serve as a tool for studying the
eﬀects of institutional diﬀerences in modes and possibilities of legal enforcement.
The perhaps most interesting result from the analysis is how the probability of legal
enforcement complicates the relationship between trust and specific investments. If it is
true, what the model predicts, that the parties can realize surplus from trust by lowering
the eﬀort in writing explicit contracts, we may better understand business relationships
that are blessed with trust, but troubled with relationship specific underinvestments.
Appendix
Proof of Proposition 1.
For q ≥ q0, let v(q) be the smallest v ≥ 0 that satisfies the constraint
G(v, q) = q − 1δ (1− (1− δ)v)C(q)−D(δ)K(v) ≥ 0,
provided such v exists. Note that for D(δ)K(0) < q0 − C(q0) we have
G(0, q0) = q0 − 1δC(q0)−D(δ)K(0) = −K(0) ≤ 0
G(1, q0) = q0 − C(q0)−D(δ)K(0) > 0
For K 0(0) satisfying
D(δ)K 0(0) < 1δ (1− δ)C(q0) = q0 − C(q0)
we further have
Gv(0, q0) =
1
δ (1− δ)C(q0)−D(δ)K 0(0) > 0,
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Gvv(v, q0) = −D(δ)K 00(v) ≤ 0
Hence G(v, q0) is concave and has a smallest root v(q0) ∈ [0, 1), and moreover Gv > 0 at
this root:
Gv(v(q0), q0) =
1
δ (1− δ)C(q0)−D(δ)K 0(v(q0)) > 0
We further have
Gq(0, q0) = 1− 1δC 0(q0) < 1−
1
δ
C(q0)
q0
= 0
Hence v(q) ∈ [0, 1) is well defined in a right neighborhood of q0 and we have
vq(q0) = −Gq(0, q0)/Gv(v(q0), q0) > 0
Substituting from the constraint in the objective we now have
F 0(q0) = 1− C 0(q0)−D(δ)K 0(v(q0))vq(q0)
For K(0) = 0 we have v(q0) = 0 and thus F 0(q0) > 0 if K 0(0) is suﬃciently small. Hence
the optimal solution must entail q > q0 and v > 0. By continuity this will hold also for
K(0) positive and small.
For q > q0 we have
Gq(0, q) = 1− 1δC 0(q) < Gq(0, q0) < 0
Gv(0, q) >
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(0) > Gv(0, q0) > 0
So G(0, q) < G(0, q0) ≤ 0 and G(v, q) is an initially increasing concave function of v ≥ 0.
If G(v, q) = 0 has a root, the smallest root v(q) thus satisfies
Gv(v(q), q) =
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v(q)) > 0.
(ForK(v) nonlinear there may in non-generic cases be isolated points q whereGv(v(q), q) =
0.)
The optimal solution must entail q < qF . Suppose otherwise. For q ≥ qF and v < 1
we have
−Gq(v, q) = 1δ (1− (1− δ)v)C 0(q)− 1 > −Gq(1, qF ) = 0
We thus have vq > 0 and hence F 0(q) < 0; a contradiction. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 2
To prove the proposition consider
Fqδ = −D0(δ)K 0(v)vq(q, δ)−D(δ) [K 00(v)vδvq +K 0(v)vqδ ]
The partials of v() can be obtained from the constraint. For later reference we consider a
slightly more general constraint, including an additive term u(δ) as follows:
G(q, v; δ) = q − 1δ (1− (1− δ)v)C(q)−D(δ)K(v)− u(δ) = 0
The partials of G() are:
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Gδ =
1−v
δ2
C(q)−D0(δ)K(v)− u0(δ)
Gv =
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
Gq = 1− 1δ (1− (1− δ)v)C 0(q)
Gδq =
1−v
δ2
C 0(q)
Gvq =
1
δ (1− δ)C 0(q)
Gvδ =
−1
δ2
C(q)−D0(δ)K 0(v)
The partials of v() are given by
Gq(q, v; δ) +Gv(q, v; δ)vq = 0
Gδ(q, v; δ) +Gv(q, v; δ)vδ = 0
and
Gqδ +Gqvvδ + [Gvδ +Gvvvδ] vq +Gvvqδ = 0
Substituting from these relations we have
Gvvqδ = −Gqδ −Gqvvδ − [Gvδ +Gvvvδ] vq
= −1−v
δ2
C 0(q)− 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vδ −
h
−1
δ2
C(q)−D0(δ)K 0(v)−D(δ)K 00(v)vδ
i
vq
Consider now
GvFqδ = −D0(δ)K 0(v)Gvvq −D(δ)
£
K 00(v)Gvvδvq +K 0(v)Gvvqδ
¤
(11)
Substituting from the expression for Gv in the first two terms, and from the last expression
for Gvvqδ in the last term, we obtain after some algebra (the algebra is included at the
end of this proof):
δ
D(δ)
GvFqδ = K
0(v)
E(δ)
δ
C(q)vq−K 00(v)(1−δ)C(q)vδvq+K 0(v)
µ
1− v
δ
+ (1− δ)vδ
¶
C 0(q)
(12)
where E(δ) = (−D0(δ))δ(1− δ)/D(δ)− 1. Accounting for D(δ) = 1 and D(δ) = 1− δ we
may write
E(δ) = (−D0(δ))δ(1− δ)/D(δ)− 1 = −D(δ).
Moreover, the equilibrium condition (7) implies
C(q)vq = C(q)
1−C0(q)
D(δ)K0(v) = C
0(q)(1− v).
Substituting this into (12) we get
δ
D(δ)
GvFqδ = (−D(δ) + 1)K 0(v)
1− v
δ
C 0(q) +
£
K 0(v)−K 00(v)(1− v)
¤
(1− δ)C 0(q)vδ
It follows from the proof of Proposition 1 that Gv > 0 at the equilibrium point. So Fqδ has
the same sign as the expression on the right-hand side of the last equation. Accounting
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again for D(δ) = 1 and D(δ) = 1 − δ we may write 1−D(δ)δ = −D0(δ). Substituting this
into the expression we see that formula (6) holds.
Then consider vδ, which is given by
Gvvδ = −Gδ = −
1− v
δ2
C(q) +D0(δ)K(v) + u0(δ)
In the present case we have u(δ) ≡ 0 and D0(δ) ≤ 0. Since Gv > 0, it follows that vδ < 0.
We finally include the algebra leading from (11) to (12). Making the substitutions as
indicated in the paragraph following (11) we have
GvFqδ = −D0(δ)K 0(v)Gvvq −D(δ) [K 00(v)Gvvδvq +K 0(v)Gvvqδ ]
= −D0(δ)K 0(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
¤
vq
−D(δ)K 00(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
¤
vδvq
−D(δ)K 0(v)
³
−1−v
δ2
C 0(q)− 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vδ −
h
−1
δ2
C(q)−D0(δ)K 0(v)−D(δ)K 00(v)vδ
i
vq
´
= −D0(δ)K 0(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
¤
vq
−D(δ)
¡
K 00(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
¤¢
vδvq
+D(δ)K 0(v)
³
1−v
δ2
C 0(q) + 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vδ
´
+D(δ)K 0(v)
h³
−1
δ2
C(q)−D0(δ)K 0(v)
´
vq −D(δ)K 00(v)vδvq
i
= K 0(v)
³
−D0(δ)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
¤
+D(δ)
³
−1
δ2
C(q)−D0(δ)K 0(v)
´´
vq
−D(δ)
¡
K 00(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v)
¤
+K 0(v)D(δ)K 00(v)
¢
vδvq
+D(δ)K 0(v)
³
1−v
δ2
C 0(q) + 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vδ
´
= K 0(v)
³
(−D0)1δ (1− δ)C(q)− (−D0)D(δ)K 0(v) +D(δ)
−1
δ2
C(q)−D0D(δ)K 0(v)
´
vq
−D(δ)
¡
K 00(v)1δ (1− δ)C(q)−K 00(v)D(δ)K 0(v) +K 0(v)D(δ)K 00(v)
¢
vδvq
+D(δ)K 0(v)
³
1−v
δ2
C 0(q) + 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vδ
´
= K 0(v)
³
[(−D0)δ(1− δ)−D(δ)] 1
δ2
C(q) + 0
´
vq
−D(δ)K 00(v)1δ (1− δ)C(q)vδvq
+D(δ)K 0(v)
³
1−v
δ2
C 0(q) + 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vδ
´
From the definition of E(δ) we see that (12) holds. This completes the proof.
Proof of Proposition 3
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The proof is similar to the proof of Proposition 2. Since q0(κ) has the same sign as
Fqκ, consider
Fqκ(q, δ,κ) = D(δ) [−K 0κ(v)vq −K 00(v)vκvq −K 0(v)vqκ]
The partials of v() can be obtained from the constraint. For later reference we consider
also here a slightly more general constraint, including an additive term u(δ,κ) as follows:
G(q, v; δ) = q − 1δ (1− (1− δ)v)C(q)−D(δ)K(v)− u(δ,κ) = 0
The partials of v() are given by
Gq(q, v; δ,κ) +Gv(q, v; δ,κ)vq = 0
Gκ(q, v; δ,κ) +Gv(q, v; δ,κ)vκ = 0
and
Gqκ +Gqvvκ + [Gvκ +Gvvvκ] vq +Gvvqκ = 0
Computing the partials of G() and substituting from the last relation into the expression
for Fqκ we obtain, after some algebra (the algebra is included at the end of this proof):
1
D(δ)
GvFqκ = −K 0κ(v)Gvvq −K 00(v)Gvvκvq −K 0(v)Gvvqκ (13)
=
¡
−K 0κ(v)C(q)vq −K 00(v)C(q)vκvq +K 0(v)C 0(q)vκ
¢ 1− δ
δ
Using the equilibrium relation C(q)vq = C 0(q)(1− v) as in the proof of Proposition 2 we
see that the parenthesis in the last line of (13) can be written as
(−K 0κ(v)(1− v)−K 00(v)(1− v)vκ +K 0(v)vκ)C 0(q)
Since Gv > 0 it follows that Fqκ and hence q0(κ) has the same sign as the last expression.
This proves condition (8) in the proposition.
Next consider vκ, which is given by
Gvvκ = −Gκ = D(δ)Kκ(v,κ) + uκ(δ,κ)
Since u(δ,κ) ≡ 0 in the present case, we see that vκ has the same sign as Kκ.
Finally consider the algebra that verifies the last equality in (13). We have
Gv =
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0(v,κ)
Gq = 1− 1δ (1− (1− δ)v)C 0(q)
Gκq = 0
Gvq =
1
δ (1− δ)C 0(q)
Gvκ = −D(δ)K 0κ(v,κ)
and thus
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Gvvqκ = −Gqκ −Gqvvκ − [Gvκ +Gvvvκ] vq
= 0− 1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vκ −D(δ) [−K 0κ −K 00vκ] vq
Substituting into the first line of (13) we have
1
D(δ)GvFqκ = −K 0κ(v)Gvvq −K 00(v)Gvvκvq −K 0(v)Gvvqκ
= −K 0κ(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0
¤
vq
−K 00(v)
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0
¤
vκvq
−K 0(v)
¡
−1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vκ −D(δ) [−K 0κ −K 00vκ] vq
¢
= K 0κ
¡
−
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0
¤
vq −D(δ)K 0vq
¢
+
¡
−K 00
£
1
δ (1− δ)C(q)−D(δ)K 0
¤
−D(δ)K 0K 00
¢
vκvq
−K 0(v)
¡
−1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vκ
¢
= −K 0κ 1δ (1− δ)C(q)vq
−K 00 1δ (1− δ)C(q)vκvq
+K 0(v)1δ (1− δ)C 0(q)vκ
This accords with the last line of (13) and hence completes the proof.
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